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7 Explicating ‘creativity’
Paisley Livingston
Given the many ways people use the word, it seems unlikely that  ‘creativity’ 
names a single concept shared by all reasonably well-informed parties. An 
explication of  ‘creativity’ can, however, identify “a good thing to mean” by 
this term in the context of  systematic enquiry.1 Contributing to such an 
explication is the aim of  this chapter. My focus is on creative actions and 
achievements. What makes such things creative, I propose, is originality 
in the devising of  an effective means to some end. This proposal stands 
in contrast to value-neutral conceptions of  creativity, as well as to vari-
ous honorific conceptions according to which the pursuit or realisation of  
good goals is necessary to creativity.
My point of  departure is the oft-repeated claim that creativity is a spe-
cies of  valuable novelty (e.g. Boden 2010: 1; Csikszentmihalyi 1996: 27). 
As the sense of  this claim depends on how its constituent concepts are 
disambiguated, in the first section I examine different notions associated 
with the expressions ‘novelty’, ‘originality’, ‘priority’, ‘unprecedented’, and 
‘innovative’. In the second section, I turn to the axiological conditions. I 
discuss some arguments supporting strong conditions as well as counter-
examples that challenge their alleged necessity. I consider a value-neutral 
idea of  creativity and propose an instrumental success condition. In the 
final section, I examine some claims about relations between novelty and 
value as constituents of  creativity. 
1 Kinds of novelty 
Although it is often stated that novelty is a necessary attribute of  all crea-
tive items, it is not easy to say just what this entails (Hausman 2009: 5). 
Is novelty only a subjective projection of  someone’s surprise or unfa-
miliarity, a pseudo-property that may be dispelled by a second look? An 
alternative to this sort of  subjectivism about novelty is to identify it as a 
real attribute of  particular, spatio-temporally located events. Yet, such a 
notion would appear to be vacuous because every particular event or action 
is novel in that it has never happened before. Perhaps it would be better to 
say that an event is novel only if  it is the first instance of  a kind. Second 
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and subsequent instances of  the kind are not novel, at least relative to 
that kind. There are reasons, however, why this very broad sortal–relative 
conception of  novelty is not an adequate constituent of  our explication 
of  ‘creativity’. Consider, for example, the (1970) work of  fiction by Erich 
Segal entitled Love Story, which may come to mind when one searches for 
examples of  hackneyed but lucrative popular fiction. With regard to any 
number of  kinds one might think of, this work was unquestionably first 
of  the kind. For example, it was the first best-seller romance published by 
a classics professor at Yale University. Given a broad, kind-relative eluci-
dation of  what ‘novel’ means, this was a novel feature of  the work, but 
it hardly counts for or against its creativity. What needs identifying is the 
kind or kinds that pick out the sort of  novelty that is directly relevant to 
creativity. 
Reference to some uncontroversial examples of  creative and uncreative 
achievements can help us with this problem. Consider first the accomplish-
ments of  the Russian high jumper Valeriy Brumel, who used the familiar 
straddle technique to set the first of  his six world records at the high jump 
in 1961, being the first to clear the bar at 2.23 metres (Matthews 2012: 
42–43). This was a skilled and exceptional performance, but was it crea-
tive? It seems perfectly obvious that it was not. If  you doubt this, try to say 
which features of  his performance were ‘creative’ or manifested creativity.
Consider now another athlete, Richard Fosbury, who abandoned the 
straddle technique in the early 1960s and came up with a new way of  jump-
ing by turning his back to the bar just before taking off. Using this effec-
tive new technique that he had independently devised, Fosbury won an 
Olympic gold medal and set an Olympic (but not world) record in 1968 
(Matthews 2012: 82). Fosbury’s achievement is widely acclaimed as crea-
tive (e.g. Kaufmann and Runco 2009: 156). What is far less well known is 
that a Canadian athlete, Debbie Brill, independently developed a similar 
technique some two years after he had done so (Oliver 2014: 39–40). Brill 
became the Canadian national high jump champion, but never achieved the 
fame enjoyed by Fosbury, who was her elder by six years, and who was first 
to use the back-to-the-bar technique in major international competitions.
In their contributions to the sport, all three jumpers shared the end 
of  maximising the height at which the bar was crossed in keeping with 
the rules of  the event. The key difference between the achievements of  
Fosbury and Brill, on the one hand, and Brumel’s, on the other, is that 
even though Brumel successfully cleared the bar at unprecedented levels, 
he did not innovate with regard to technique. In contrast, Fosbury was 
the first to come up with an unprecedented means to the end of  excel-
ling in high-jump competitions: the “Fosbury flop.” Brill too was no mere 
copy-cat: she independently developed her own backward jump (‘the Brill 
bend’) well before Fosbury’s innovation became famous by virtue of  his 
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televised use of  the technique at the 1968 Olympics. These cases suggest 
that at least one important kind of  novelty we are looking for with regard 
to creativity is novelty in devising a means to some end. Given the goal 
of  their chosen sporting event, Fosbury and Brill were both innovative in 
precisely this sense, while Brumel was not. 
Is this result generalizable to uncontroversial examples of  creative 
achievements in other domains? It is easy to find examples in the arts 
that fit the pattern. Consider the case of  Un chien andalou, a short film co-
authored by Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí in 1929. The filmmakers’ most 
immediate goals in making this film were to shock or épater a bourgeois 
audience and to exemplify surrealist attitudes using the cinematic medium 
(Admowicz 2010: 9). These were not new goals, but given those ends, 
the making of  this film was both an effective and an innovative achieve-
ment. Various cinematic devices are used to baffle and annoy any viewer 
who expects the film to present some kind of  commonsensical or familiar 
sequence of  story events. Most famously, early in the film there is a dis-
turbing montage sequence in which a man appears to slice a woman’s eye 
with a razor. A very remote literary antecedent could perhaps be identified 
in Shakepeare’s line, “Out vile jelly? Where is thy lustre now?” (The Tragedy 
of  King Lear 1917: III, vii, 82), but no such surprising and shocking mon-
tage had been included in a film before.2
It is possible to identify many other examples of  creative achieve-
ments involving the devising of  new means for the realisation of  ends. 
To mention a few cases that often come up in the literature on creativity, 
Goodyear found a new means of  preparing rubber in the making of  tyres; 
Jenner found a new technique for preventing disease using vaccinations; 
Galileo found ways to test, refute, and improve on Aristotle’s claims about 
motion; and so on. 
Coming up with unprecedented means to some goal looks to be crucial 
to the novelty of  creative achievements. With this in mind, the relevant 
explication of  ‘novel’ can be stated as follows:
(N1) a particular action, α
1
, performed by A at t
1
 using means, M, is novel
1
 
just in case it is the first instance in which M was used to perform an action 
of  kind α. 
Berys Gaut (personal communication) raised the objection that it is also 
possible to be creative in the generation of  ends, in which case the sort of  
novelty identified above would not be necessary to creativity. For exam-
ple, someone could independently recognise or make friendship, beauty, 
freedom, or the good life a final value; that person could even have been 
the very first human being in all history to have done so. If  that is so, the 
‘just in case’ in (N1) is too ambitious and should be replaced by an ‘if ’. 
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I wonder, however, whether these sorts of  cases should be identified as 
creative achievements if  the relevant agents devised no new means to the 
realisation of  actual instances of  the final value in question. Simply valuing 
x intrinsically, or acquiring the attitude that some x is a final end, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to realising a creative achievement, whereas com-
ing up with innovative means to such ends, possibly along with the original 
discovery or invention of  those ends, would be both. 
There is at least one other potential problem with (N1): only one of  
the relevant senses of  ‘novel’ is identified. I have in mind a distinction that 
Robert K. Merton (1957) couched in terms of  ‘originality’ and ‘priority’. 
Following Merton’s stipulation, someone who is the very first to make a 
discovery or invention has priority, and this is the sense of  ‘novel’ identi-
fied by (N1). ‘Originality’, Merton stipulates, refers to a discovery that is 
realised independently, but that may or may not have priority. Here is how 
‘novelty’ in the sense of  Merton’s ‘originality’ might be elucidated:
(N2) a particular action, α
1
, performed by A at t
1
 using means, M, is novel
2
 
just in case it is the first instance in which A used M to perform an action of  
kind α
, 
where A’s intentional use of  M to perform α
1
 does not depend on any 
knowledge on the part of  A of  someone else’s prior use of  M to perform 
actions of  type α. 
Given (N1) and (N2), we can say that Fosbury is credited with priority; 
Brill manifested originality, but did not have priority; and Brumel had 
neither—with regard to technique, that is. What if  Brill had heard about 
Fosbury’s flop, but then forgot all about it and later rediscovered the ‘new’ 
technique? If  this rediscovery was causally dependent on Brill’s earlier 
knowledge of  Fosbury’s action (by virtue, say, of  some unconscious psy-
chological process), then this would not be a case of  originality. 
Does (N1) or (N2) give us the primary or even the only relevant sense 
in which a creative achievement is novel? In her influential contributions 
to the literature on creativity, Margaret A. Boden weighs in on the side of  
originality—or what she calls ‘psychological creativity’, as opposed to his-
torical creativity (Merton’s ‘priority’). She claims that the latter allows of  no 
“systematic explanation” (1990: 34). Psychological creativity, she observes 
(2009: 238), does not entail historical creativity, whereas every case of  his-
torical creativity involves some kind of  psychological process. “The first 
step to understanding H-creativity is to understand P-creativity,” Boden 
adds in the same context, going on to say that the study of  psychological 
creativity should be granted methodological priority because it concerns 
the “core processes” that are involved in creativity. With regard to the psy-
chological springs of  originality, Boden consistently refers to changes to 
what she calls a “conceptual space” or “landscape with a characteristic 
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structure and potential,” as well as to the “generative principles” and 
“rules” constitutive of  a mental space or domain. She argues that the really 
striking instances of  creativity involve changes in these rules or constraints.
Boden could be right about the relevance of  originality to creativity 
even if  (as is argued in Novitz 1999) her claims about the core processes at 
work in creativity turn out to be mistaken or lacking in explanatory depth. 
In other words, it would be a mistake to deny the salient, creative difference 
between Brill’s and Brumel’s athletic achievements on the grounds that 
Brill did not have priority, and one sees no other grounds on which such a 
denial might be based. The excellent reasons we have for attributing crea-
tivity to Fosbury for his invention of  the flop carry over without loss to 
Brill’s independent invention of  her bend. The differences between their 
two achievements with regard to priority versus originality have to do with the 
historical context in which an individual does something and with that per-
son’s knowledge or ignorance of  relevant antecedent achievements. Since 
there is no priority without originality, the live question is whether the nov-
elty component of  creativity could be exclusively a matter of  originality, in 
the sense of  (N2). In the rest of  this section I survey and assess considera-
tions relevant to this question.
While it would be most convenient to set priority aside and understand 
creativity entirely in terms of  originality, this overlooks some aspects of  
the value that people often look for in creative achievements. Priority, and 
not just originality, remains a kind of  novelty or innovation that people 
are often interested in identifying. With regard to actions and ideas in vari-
ous pursuits or fields of  endeavour, people want to know when and how 
the first instances took place, and they want to know this in general, and 
not just relative to a particular person or some restricted domain of  activ-
ity. Merton and his colleagues investigated the great emphasis placed in 
scientific institutions on priority of  discovery, as evidenced by the many 
controversies over priority—a well-known example being the bitter dis-
pute between Newton, Leibniz, and their followers over the invention of  
the calculus. The solution was clearly not a matter of  saying that the really 
important sort of  creativity resided in how the advent of  these mathemati-
cal ideas stood in relation to the individual thinkers’ own prior activities or 
psychological states. The dispute would not have been settled had it been 
established that Leibniz had manifested greater personal originality than 
had Newton, or vice versa, nor would it have helped if  it had been discov-
ered that both thinkers had exhibited equal measures of  originality. What 
the parties in the Prioritätstreit wanted to know was which thinker came 
up with the valuable ideas first and why would that sort of  achievement 
be deemed superior to one that manifest only originality. Merton conjec-
tures that the key function of  the institutionalised emphasis on priority is 
to motivate scientists to make and publish new discoveries and thereby 
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contribute to the independently valued growth of  scientific knowledge. In 
such a context, priority of  publication could even trump priority of  dis-
covery since it is the former that best serves scientific knowledge as a social 
institution. Perhaps an analogous argument could be given to explain the 
emphasis on priority in other domains, but there could be other and more 
fundamental reasons as well, such as a spontaneous admiration for realis-
ing the (increasingly) difficult feat of  coming up with something nobody 
else has managed to do before. 
Epistemic problems besetting claims about priority may be taken as 
grounds for an exclusive focus on originality. In response to this thought, 
it must be acknowledged that sometimes the “who was first?” question 
finds no solid answer, so we are left with a choice between agnosticism 
and risky conjectures when it comes to priority. So why not give up on 
that notion entirely and focus entirely on originality? One reason why that 
might not be the best policy is that in some cases the evidence about pri-
ority stacks up very well. In the case of  Fosbury and Brill, we have their 
testimony and the public record of  their respective athletic performances 
and training. In interviews, Fosbury acknowledged Brill’s independent 
invention of  her bend; Brill did not contest Fosbury’s priority (Brill and 
Lawton 1986).3 There is no good reason to doubt that Fosbury had prior-
ity, even if  we cannot undertake a perfectly exhaustive and infallible search 
proving that no one else ever tried jumping with his or her back to the bar 
prior to Fosbury’s famous performance. Also, is knowledge of  originality, 
as opposed to priority, any more certain? When we attribute originality 
to someone, can we be absolutely certain that this person has not know-
ingly or unwittingly copied someone else’s achievement? In some cases, 
establishing that there was no copying or unconscious influence could be 
just as difficult as establishing a claim about world-historical priority. So, 
epistemic worries and desiderata are hardly decisive when it comes to the 
question of  what sorts of  novelty are relevant to creativity.
There is also a question about the scope of  priority. Is it appropriate 
or even viable to think in terms of  priority relative to all human history 
as opposed, say, to more limited domains, such as a given socio-cultural 
sphere or tradition? For example, do not many people discussing the crea-
tivity of  some item restrict their remarks to Asian or Western spheres, 
thereby dropping unmanageable questions of  absolute historical priority?4 
One response to this question is that this is a practically useful tactic but not 
one that reflects a defensible substantive position regarding novelty. It is 
perhaps telling that if  sufficient evidence arises indicating that the bound-
ary between traditions or cultures was in fact crossed, and that an apparent 
innovation in one tradition was actually borrowed from or influenced by 
an earlier innovation in a different tradition, assessments of  the former 
innovation are revised accordingly. An example would be art historians’ 
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tracking down Asian and African sources for seemingly  innovative features 
of  modernist Western art. 
To sum this part up, priority is often valued over originality. A single-
minded focus on originality has the shortcoming of  overlooking this 
well-entrenched interest in priority. On the other hand, it would be wrong 
to deem priority strictly necessary to the kind of  novelty required of  all 
creative achievements. Priority is, however, sufficient to it, as is original-
ity. Though there is no priority without originality, there can be originality 
without priority—as the Brill bend case was taken as establishing. One 
aspect of  Brill’s situation is that it would have been very difficult for her to 
have known about Fosbury’s prior experimentation with the flop. In this 
regard, she may be contrasted to someone who manages a feat of  original-
ity while remaining irresponsibly ignorant of  prior accomplishments. Such 
a person’s achievement is likely to be deemed less creative than that of  
someone who was reasonably aware of  relevant antecedents and nonethe-
less manages to devise an effective new technique. 
Does novelty in the sense of  originality, or (N2) above, suffice to pick 
out the actions and products to be classified as creative? Not according to 
the proponents of  honorific explications of  creativity, who hold that some 
behaviour or its product is creative only if  it satisfies a strong axiological 
condition, which most often amounts to requiring that anything creative 
must be good for its own sake, or at least good as a means to some genu-
inely valuable end. In other words, even if  an action or invention is novel 
in the sense of  exhibiting psychological originality, it could still fail to be 
creative if  it does not manifest the right sort of  value. Such strong claims 
about the relations between creativity and value are examined in the next 
section. 
2 Creativity and value
Are robust value conditions on creativity conceptual truths? Do they iden-
tify essential features of  all genuinely creative actions and their products? 
Or are they desiderata regarding what merits recognition as instances of  
good or exemplary creativity? I argue for the latter option in this section: it is 
doubtful that strong normative conditions are met in all of  the events or 
achievements that it is a good idea to classify as creative. As Berys Gaut 
(forthcoming) puts it, “not all exercises of  creativity are valuable, since not 
all the kinds produced are valuable.” More bluntly, it is not contradictory 
to speak of  ‘bad creativity’. A weaker axiological condition, may, however, 
be warranted, and below I explore ways in which it might be formulated 
and defended.
In arguing that there can be bad creativity, I claim neither priority nor 
originality. In a paper first published in 1954, C. R. Rogers reported on a 
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similar intuition: “One man may be discovering a way of  relieving pain, 
whereas another is devising a new and more subtle form of  torture for 
political prisoners. Both these actions seem to me creative” (1970: 139). 
In the same vein, Robert B. McClaren (1993) recognises the existence 
of  harmful creativity, and more recently, David H. Cropley, James C. 
Kaufman, and Arthur J. Cropley (2008) allow that criminal and terrorist 
actions, such as the 9/11 attacks, can be ‘highly creative’. 
To embroider on Rogers’ example, imagine an evil but creative torturer 
who acts on entirely sadistic motives. This vile fiend creates a device that 
has a new way of  inflicting unprecedented amounts of  pain on the victims. 
The invention is creative but evil. If  it is objected that the device must 
have some good uses or valuable side effects, it would be fair to ask why 
that must be so. How (and when) was it established that if  some α is an 
effective means to some valueless or evil end E, necessarily, α serves as an 
effective means to some valuable or good end, E’?
Some readers may protest that the torture-device counterexample is a 
philosophical conceit. For those who prefer actual examples, the annals 
of  crime include many cases of  creative wrongdoings incompatible with 
a strong axiological condition involving the actual promotion of  a final 
good (Cropley and Cropley 2013).5 Many of  the creative felonies reported 
by law enforcement agencies were not only immoral, but proved in the 
long run to be self-defeating for the perpetrators, and so fail even to satisfy 
weak conditions on prudential value or rationality with a small ‘r’.
Advocates of  honorific Creativity with a capital ‘c’ may deny on intui-
tive grounds that such examples are really creative. Yet, what arguments can 
be given in support of  such rulings? There are precious few in the lit-
erature. One salient attempt is David Novitz’s bold (2003) effort to derive 
an honorific notion of  creativity from conceptual truths. He contends 
that behaviour that is “destructive” cannot be creative, because creation 
and destruction are antithetical: “It is a conceptual truth that creative and 
destructive acts exclude and need to be distinguished from each other in 
any theory of  creativity” (2003: 186). This is not a successful argument, as 
James Grant (2012) has contended. It may well be conceptually true that 
one cannot create and destroy something in the same sense at the same 
time, but it is not contradictory to say that some action or invention could 
be creative as well as sadistic. Novitz equivocates when he asserts that 
“acts that are deliberately harmful or malicious are properly thought of  as 
destructive” (2003: 185). In the example as I conceive of  it, the sadist cre-
ates and uses a novel instrument of  torture that can be used to inflict great 
pain, and there is no good end served by this invention. Yet the victim is 
not literally destroyed in any “proper” sense, so the example does not fall 
under Novitz’s ban on saying oxymoronically that some act is “creatively 
destructive.” As Matthew Kieran notes in this regard, whether something 
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is immoral is distinct from whether it is destructive: it is good to destroy 
some bad things.6
In an earlier paper, Novitz proposed an explication of  ‘creative’ based 
on a weaker condition to the effect that creative acts must be “intended 
to be, and are potentially, of  real value to some people” (1999: 77). This 
clause as well does not look to express a defensible conceptual truth. 
Just what would count as a telling counterexample to such a condition 
depends on how the expressions ‘real value’ and ‘potentially’ are under-
stood. If  it is allowed that the innovative torture device potentially has real 
value to the sadistic torturer who plans on using it, then the condition has 
become extremely weak—too weak to support genuinely honorific intui-
tions about creativity. If, however, this is not admitted, and the innovative 
torture device is recognised as creative, we have a counterexample to the 
honorific conception. A better argument is wanted if  it is to be established 
that Creativity covers all relevant cases. 
Another strategy that could be taken up in this regard would be to 
appeal to an Aristotle-inspired doctrine of  the unity of  the virtues.7 The 
basic idea is that evil actions cannot be creative any more than novel crimi-
nal scheming can be an instance of  phronesis, practical wisdom, or any other 
virtue. But in a context where doubt about a strong axiological condition 
is on the table, this argument for a moral condition on creativity is unac-
ceptably question-begging because it relies upon the contested assump-
tion that creativity is directly dependent on a system of  inter-related moral 
or intellectual virtues. No virtue, no creativity, reads the contested premise. 
Someone who doubts this premise can hold that creativity is not a vir-
tue at all, but a feature of  behaviour independent of  a holistic system of  
positive moral personality dispositions or traits. It may be worth recalling 
that Aristotle, who is an important source for the thesis of  the unity of  
the virtues, explicitly allows in his Nicomachean Ethics (2000: 1144a) that 
both practically wise and villainous people can be clever [deinos]. Why can 
creativity not have the same status as cleverness in Aristotle’s scheme, in 
which case it too could be manifest in either virtuous or immoral actions? 
We lack a reason why creative acts cannot be similar to clever ones in this 
respect and not necessarily be the product of  practical wisdom working in 
harmony with the other virtues. 
Another way to argue for an axiological condition on creativity runs as 
follows. The first premise is that the term ‘creative’ names a property man-
ifested only by purposeful behaviour and its artifacts; on this view, no mat-
ter how novel and worthwhile they may be, non-purposeful natural events 
and objects cannot be creative. Since they belong to the larger category of  
purposive doings, creative acts and products all have an intentional source 
relative to which they are valued or prized in at least a subjective sense. 
So for all agents, S, and actions, α, S’s doing α cannot be creative unless 
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S values doing α. It follows validly that all creative actions are valuable at 
least from the perspective of  the agent. 
There are, however, plausible objections to this line of  thought. Suppose 
our creative sadist is a wanton individual who does not value his own sadis-
tic inclinations and corresponding actions. Driven by impulses he cannot 
control, the sadist nonetheless finds clever, novel ways to satisfy his crav-
ings. The result is a series of  creative acts that do not satisfy even the 
weakened axiological condition just mentioned. To deal with such a case, 
we could revise the condition and change S’s necessary attitude from val-
ues to wants, desires, or preferences, but then we end up with something 
too weak to serve as an honorific concept of  Creativity, if  only because 
the wants and desires in question could be immoral or self-defeating, even 
from the perspective of  the agent. The crux of  the problem is that there 
is intentional, skillful, innovative behaviour that is not a matter of  even 
trying to do good or valuable things, or even what one deems, all things 
considered, to be good or valuable things. 
Are we warranted to conclude that there is no justifiable axiological 
condition on creativity? What about instrumental value, understood as the 
devising of  effective means to ends that may themselves actually be good, 
bad, or indifferent? As was suggested above, many uncontroversial exam-
ples of  creativity manifest this sort of  efficacy or instrumental value, and 
that includes cases that do not satisfy stronger axiological conditions. An 
instrumental success condition is entailed by the formulations of  (N1) and 
(N2) above, it being implicit that the innovative means must be employed 
in the successful performance of  the action. In the complete absence of  a 
successful performance, an attribution of  creativity does not seem jus-
tifiable. For the sake of  clarity, we can recapitulate the ‘minimal creative 
action condition’ as follows:
(MC) a particular action, α
1
, successfully performed by A at t
1
 using means, 
M, is creative just in case it is the first instance in which A used M to perform 
an action of  kind α
, 
where A’s intentional use of  M to perform α
1
 does not 
depend on any knowledge on the part of  A of  someone else’s prior use of  M 
to perform actions of  type α.8 
How might one argue in favour of  such an explication of  creative achieve-
ments? Uncontroversial cases of  creative exploits fit the pattern. Pick 
any invention that is generally hailed as creative and ask whether it does 
not exhibit some measure of  success in realising the relevant goals. One 
might think that a good place to look for counterexamples would be the 
category of  creative failures. Think, for example, of  some of  the inventive 
but disastrous attempts that were made in the early history of  aviation 
(Hallion 2003, Abzug and Larrabee, 2002). Such failures are only worth 
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calling ‘creative’ because some part of  the inventor’s complex innovative 
action proved effective. For example, the design for a heavier-than-air fly-
ing machine actually generated sufficient lift to get the machine off the 
ground, which was a significant advance relative to the many previous 
devices that had failed in this regard. This part was successful, but the lack 
of  an adequate steering mechanism led to a crash. Whence the justifica-
tion for calling this invention a creative failure. The overall action did not 
satisfy (MC), but the attempt to generate sufficient lift did. Or imagine that 
someone is the first to come up with an elaborate but hopeless opening in 
chess (e.g. some system for advancing the rook and bishop pawns). This 
innovative set of  moves does not serve the object of  the game, which is 
to checkmate the opponent, since anyone who uses it is most likely to 
lose against any moderately skillful player. If  one agrees that it would not 
be appropriate to call such an ineffective innovation ‘creative’, the salient 
reason is that it has no instrumental value relative to the inventor’s goal of  
devising an effective opening in chess. It is not enough that an inventor 
anticipates or believes that his or her invention is an effective means to a 
chosen end (even if  that end is a very good end, or even a new final value); 
if  it is to be counted as creative, the innovation has to be somewhat effec-
tive in contributing to the realisation of  the end. 
This instrumental value condition is compatible, by the way, with Gaut’s 
(2009, 2014) instructive emphasis on the link between creativity and skill, 
as well as with the possibility of  an inventor’s inclusion of  stochastic ele-
ments in the creative process. It is also compatible with the akratic torturer 
example mentioned above: that horrible device works, even if  the ends are 
pernicious and not recommended by the inventor’s (or anyone else’s) best 
overall judgement.
Is (MC)—the instrumental condition coupled with the originality con-
dition—too weak to provide a viable explication of  creative achievements? 
Suppose someone settles on a pointless or silly goal—finding a way to 
lose at chess—a goal, moreover, that it is fairly easy to realise, as long as 
one’s opponent is trying to win. Suppose as well that this person, who is 
a novice at chess, unwittingly recapitulates a somewhat effective way of  
realising this goal (i.e. get your king out early), thereby manifesting some 
small measure of  originality. Do we allow that this is an instance of  crea-
tivity? Well, why not? Creativity is a matter of  degree, and this case can be 
recognised as fitting on the lower end of  the spectrum as a mildly creative 
feat that not everyone could accomplish.
Consider now the axiological condition on ‘imaginativeness’ or crea-
tivity proposed by Grant, which requires (1) that it was plausible for the 
person to believe that the item had a reasonable chance of  contributing 
significantly to its value, (2) that coming up with this item was not deriva-
tive, and (3) that thinking of  this item was not obvious (Grant 2012, 281). I 
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am not sure whether all of  these conditions are met by my ‘get the king out 
early’ example as described above. The player’s minor innovation satisfies 
the non-imitative condition, or (2), but it may fall short of  (3), the non-
obviousness requirement. Someone might think, however, that getting the 
king out early is a pretty obvious way to lose at chess. But we could well 
imagine a case where it was not really obvious to the novice chess player, 
who had to think a while and experiment a bit before coming up with it. 
What is obvious to a highly skilled player is not at all obvious to a beginner. 
Similar remarks could be made about condition (1). Given the goal of  find-
ing a way to lose at chess, the novice’s non-derivative innovation may well 
be plausibly taken, by that person, as having significant value relative to 
that aim. Someone whose intuitions indicate that this person’s chess strat-
egy is not an example of  creativity at all would need to appeal to stronger 
axiological conditions to support such a judgement. Perhaps it might be 
required that the innovation surpass the average level of  instrumental suc-
cess arrived at by the members of  some relevant group. If  novices at the 
game would on average come up with this or some equally effective solu-
tion, then such a standard would entail that even if  the ‘get the king out 
early’ tactic had a kind of  originality, it would fall short of  being creative 
by virtue of  its instrumental mediocrity. Those who hold that even the 
average performance tends to manifest creativity might, however, be dis-
inclined to take on board this condition in selecting the explication of  
‘creativity’ to be adopted in their research. 
3 Novelty and its values
If  creativity is a species of  novelty (defined as originality or priority in the 
devising of  means or final ends) having at least some measure of  instru-
mental value, what is the relation between these two conceptual constitu-
ents of  the explicated notion of  creativity? Does a successful achievement 
have its value partly by virtue of  its novelty, or are these strictly independ-
ent conditions? Could it be the case that the sort of  novelty we have iden-
tified always carries intrinsic value of  its own, which would entail that the 
explication of  creativity is honorific after all?
That novelty per se is not an intrinsically valuable property (and indeed, 
that it is not an intrinsic property at all) was argued above. Only on a bold 
and implausible stipulation of  ‘novel’ would it turn out that everything 
novel is valuable. This is, by the way, not a new point. It was put quite 
forcefully by Thomas Reid, who commented that “a thing may be new 
and yet have no agreeable quality in it” (1973 [1774]: 38). Reid adds in 
the same context that “Novelty is like a cypher in arithmetic which adds 
value to every significant figure but is of  no value in itself.” We may won-
der what Reid had in mind here if  we consider that the basic operations 
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of  arithmetic do not really work the way he suggests. He might have 
been thinking, not about arithmetic per se, but about a numeral scheme 
where 1 < 10 < 100 < 1000, etc. More recently, Bruce Vermazen (1991) 
has argued that the locus of  value is not originality as such, but other 
features of  actions or works. Vermazen allows, however, that original-
ity and other valued features could jointly provide the basis on which 
another sort of  value supervenes. Perhaps this was the sort of  thing Reid 
had in mind. 
With Reid’s and Vermazen’s remarks in mind, we ask whether there are 
cases taking the following form:
(NV) actions α and β are valuable because they both successfully realise a 
worthwhile end, Ω; β realises Ω in a non-novel manner; α manifests prior-
ity or originality in the way Ω is realised; therefore α’s realisation of  Ω is more 
valuable than β’s realisation of  Ω.
Some cases appear to exemplify (NV), but a closer look suggests that many 
if  not all of  them do not really do so. Suppose the action realising Ω via good 
old β is compared to the action, realising Ω via brand new α, and the latter is 
preferred because it has the added value of  offering a pleasurable relief  
from boredom. But then the ends realised by these two actions are not 
really equivalent: what brand new α realised, and good old β didn’t realise, was 
an Ω* that turned out to be more valuable than Ω. One can also generate 
counterexamples to (NV) if  there are cases where what is wanted is only 
an Ω realised by the traditional means and not some Ω produced by some 
new-fangled trick.
The case of  the Fosbury flop clearly does not match (NV) since the end 
Fosbury achieved using the flop was a jump higher than those he and his 
rivals could realise using the straddle or some other technique. It follows 
that the schema exemplified by Fosbury’s creative flop is not (NV) but:
(NV*) β realises Ω in a non-novel manner; α manifests priority or originality 
of  manner and realises a superior end, Ω*; Ω via β is less valuable than Ω* 
via α.
One could add that Fosbury’s novel technique was more valuable than 
the traditional one not only because it allowed him to win the Olympic 
event, but because he contributed to the larger end of  improving ath-
letes’ performance in the event (and that is another reason for saying that 
his Ω* was quite different from the Ω realised by traditional jumpers). 
One may grant this point while maintaining that Fosbury would have 
manifested creativity even if  his technique had not proved exemplary for 
other athletes.
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Conclusion
On the account developed above, some α is a creative action or achieve-
ment just in case α manifests originality as an effective means to its end, 
where there is no assumption that this end is intrinsically valuable or 
good, either in fact or in the judgement of  the creative agent. To char-
acterise creativity as novelty in devising effective means is not to deny 
its importance. In many happy cases, creative actions bring ample cog-
nitive and other rewards. Yet, creative actions and their products can 
also be maleficent or indifferent, which is what honorific notions of  
creativity fail to allow. Setting aside the honorific approach may help us 
detect more ways in which an overemphasis on creativity—in the sense 
of  originality or priority—has negative consequences, such as ill-con-
ceived and pointless innovations that are effective only in wasting time 
and energy or in making things worse. Although some authors go too 
far in condemning artistic and other innovations, it is easy to identify 
cases where novelty of  style or manner has been purchased at too high 
a price. This is hardly an original point—Kant (2001: 197) famously 
made a similar remark in paragraph 50 of  his 3rd Critique—but it is 
worth repeating.9
Notes
1 This characterisation of explications is attributed to Allan Ross Anderson (via Nuel Belnap) in 
Dupta (2015). 
2 As Alain Virmaux establishes, this was not the very first film of surrealist inspiration, and some have 
attributed priority to La coquille et le clergyman (1928), a short film directed by Germaine Dulac and 
based upon a script by Antonin Artaud. Virmaux argues that it is far from obvious that the authors 
of Un chien andalou were indebted to the ‘chronologically very close’ work by Artaud and Dulac 
(1965: 121). Un chien andalou is in any case by far the more striking specimen of surrealist cinema.
3 For a relevant interview with Fosbury, see: http://speedendurance.com/2007/06/15/dick-fosbury- 
former-olympic-high-jumper/.
4 Thanks to Andrea Sauchelli for raising this question.
5 For some popular discussions of creative crimes, see: http://www.oddee.com/item_98270.aspx, 
and http://www.businesspundit.com/10-most-imaginative-criminals/.
6 Personal communication. 
7 Matthew Kieran, talk given at Lingnan University, December 2013; for Kieran’s discussion of the psy-
chology of exemplary forms of creativity, see his previous work (2014). For critical discussions of theses 
regarding the unity of the virtues, see Wolf (2007) and Sreenivasan (2009).
8 Stiffer conditions might be devised by weighing additional constraints on the creative par-
ty’s knowledge of antecedent achievements, or by raising the standard of instrumental value 
or ‘success’.
9 A version of parts of this chapter was presented at the Frontiers of the Philosophy of Literature 
Conference, Syddansk Universitet, Odense, Denmark in September 2015; I thank Peter Lamarque, 
Lanier Anderson, Catrin Misselhorn, Dorte Jelstrup, and other participants for helpful queries and 
comments. Thanks as well go to Andrea Sauchelli and Dorte Jelstrup for their comments on an early 
draft of this chapter. I am especially grateful to both Matthew Kieran and Berys Gaut for very helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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